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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 15307

vs.
JAMES W. BRADLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action brought by the State of Utah
against the appellant for the offense of criminal homicide in
violation of Title 76, Section 5, Paragraph 207, Utah Code
Annotated,

1953 as amended, wherein the appellant was accused

of causing the death of another person while operating a motor
vehicle in a negligent manner while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury in Davis County on May
26 and 27,

1977.

The appellant was found not guilty of criminal

homicide as charged in the information, but was found guilty of
running a red light, and guilty of driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.

The court sentenced the appellant to a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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term of six months in the Davis County Jail and to pay a

f 1ne c

$299.00, from which the appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the
against him or,

· d

JU gments rendert

in the alternative, a remand to the lower cour~

for a new trial consistant with due process.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arose out of an automobile accident whic;.
occurred on September ll,

1976 at approximately 6:15 P.M. at u,,

intersection of State Road No. 106 and Center Streets, in Noru
Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah.

State Road No. 106 runs in a

north-south direction and Center Street runs northeasterly
southwesterly.
light.

a~

The intersection is controlled by a traffic

At approximately ll: 30 A.M.

(T. 224) on the morning of:

accident the appellant arrived at the maintenance shop of the
construction company for whom he was employed.

He testified (1

that between 11: 30 A.M. and 5:45 P.M. that date, he had consume:
four or five beers while working on his truck.

He left the she:

shortly before 5:45P.M., travelling several blocks to his

bro~

in-law's home where he consumed several pieces of chicken (T.ll:
He then started home, driving south on State Road 106.

The

1!~·

pickup truck he was driving collided with a vehicle eastbound c
center Street in the intersection of State Road 106 and Center
Street.

The driver of the other vehicle died as a result of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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injuries sustained in that accident.

u

t

ah

Highway Patrol Trooper

Daryl W. Durrant, testified (T.64) that he arrived at the accident
scene at approximately 6:22P.M. after having been informed of
the accident on his radio.

Upon arrival at the scene he assisted

in the removal of the injured parties, and more than one hour
after the accident he first observed the appellant (T. 82 & 91).
He testified

(T.65) that he noticed an odor of alcohol about the

appellant and gave the appellant what he referred to as a "field
sobriety test"

(T.66) consisting of several maneuvers in which

the appellant was asked to stand with his feet and knees together
with his arms outstretched, close his eyes, and tilt his head
back.

He testified (T.69) the appellant swayed unsteadily.

He

then asked the appellant to perform a finger to nose test with his
feet and knees together and he testified (T.70) that the appellant
touched his finger to his upper lip.

Officer Durrant then asked

the appellant to walk an imaginary line, and on command, turn on
his heel and return to the starting poir.t.

He testified (T.71)

the appellant was walking the line "a fairly good job until he
turned around" at which time he tended to lose his balance, but
did not fall.

Officer Durrant also asked the appellant (T.71) to

walk around a flash light which had been placed on the ground in
an upright position while bent over.

He testified (T.72) the

appellant was able to go around the flash light only twice.
Trooper Durrant completed his investigation at the accident scene
and then took the appellant (T.74) to his employer's shop on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-3-Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Cudahy Lane, and then to the Davis County Jail.
asked the appellant at 8:40 P.M.

(T. 97)

Trooper Durran:

to take a "breathalyzer

test which was administered to him at 9:50P.M. on the evening
of the accident.

Test results taken on the St evenson Corporatlc

Breathalyzer, Model 900, reported a reading of .06 and were
admitted into evidence as Exhibit "I"
witness testified

(T · 175) ·

One prosecution

(T.48) she had observed the traffic light was

green to the traffic on Center Street as she was approaching t~
intersection of Center Street and Highway 106 but that

shed~~

observe the light at the time of the accident (T.49).

several

witnesses fer the defense testified

211)

(T.

183, 193, 202,

that they had observed the appellant just prior to the accident
and subsequent to the accident,

that they did not notice any

peculiarity in the appellant's coordination or speech, and thu
in their opinion, he was not "drunk," although he was shaken up.
Lt. Newell G. Knight of the Utah Highway Patrol testil.·
(T.l05)

that he was the technical supervisor of chemical

for the State of Utah.

testin~

He testified (T.l40) that he had never

drawn blood, nor had an occasion to be trained in checking blooc
He also testified

(T. 141) that there was nothing in the operatic

of the breathalyzer that would convert breath alcohol by vol~e
blood alcohol by weight.

Exhibits "H", a checklist for breath~l'

and "I", breathalyzer results, were offered into evidence and
were objected to by defense counsel
testified

(T.l5l).

Trooper Knight

(T. 244) that he had never actually, by his own experie

run blood samples and that he was only taking somebody else's we
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l

as to what blood alcohol tests ran.

He also testified (T.245)

that the body rids itself of alcohol in a rather predictable
fashion and that the body loses about one drink an hour, which
equates to a 12 oz. can of beer (T.246).
a

~ypothetical question

Trooper Knight was asked

(T.237) and allowed to testify (T.247)

as to how much alcohol would be in a person's system after consuming
4 or 5 beers between 11:30 A.M. and 9:50P.M.
Dr. Terry H. Rich, Deputy Medical Examiner for the State
of Utah,

testified (T.l59) that he had studied toxicology and the

metabolism of alcohol in the body.

Dr. Rich testified (T.l66)

that the average body can burn off approximately 9 mililiters
to 15 mililiters of alcohol per hour and (T.l70) that there was
a differentiation of 100% between the high and the low metabolism
rate for alcohol.

He further testified (T.l7l)there was no way

of determining whether an individual, such as the appellant, could
be at the top range or at the bottom range of metabolism and that
to do so would be pure speculation.
Upon conclusion of the testimony the jury was given
instructions

(T.254) as set forth in 41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated

1953, as amended and

(T.262) that their verdict must be:

(1)

Guilty of criminal homicide, or

(2)

Guilty of driving while under the influence of

intoxicating liquor, a lesser included offense, or
(3)

Guilty of running a red light, a lesser included

offense, or
NotLawguilty.
Sponsored by the(4)
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The jury returned verdicts (R.66, 67, 68, 69) that
appellant was guilty of running a red light, gu1lty of

t

driv 1 ~

while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and not guuof criminal homicide.

The court entered an order (R.74) that

the appellant serve a term of six months in the Davis County
Jail and pay a fine of $299.00.

The appellant appeals that

judgment.
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POINT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A CONVICTION OF
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL.
The jury, after deliberating for several hours, found
the defendant not guilty of autornob;le
h om~cide,
·
76-5-207, Utah
•
Code Annotated, which required finding beyond a reasonable doubt
the following elements.
A.

The defendant was driving an automobile (which
is conceded) .

B.

In Davis County, Utah (which is conceded).

C.

That there was simple negligence (the jury found
the defendant guilty of running a red light.

D.

That the defendant was driving under the influence
of alcohol (see Instruction No. 6), 41-6-44, Utah
Code Annotated.

A review of the evidence shows that several of the
State's witnesses and all of the defendant's witnesses observed
the defendant, either immediately before or immediately after the
accident or both, and none of that testimony suggests that he was
impaired in any way at the time.

(See State witness Mills testi-

mony at T.21, witness Welton, T.39-40, Witness Wentz, T.SO and
defense witness Lannie Lee Lloyd, T.l85 and 190, MarciaLloyd,
T.l95-197, Glenn Orvis France, T.204 and George A. Sanders, T.215)
Officer Durrant, Utah Highway Patrol,

gave a series

of coordination tests more than one hour after the accident that

-7- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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were not satisfactory to the officer, but f

rom reading the d
esc:
and Officer Mills
' tr.,
tests could not be considered as conclusive ·
~n any way' especia:
with the realization that the defendant had been
·t·
wa~ ~ng for o
n,
tion of the tests by both Officer Durrant

and one-half hours after a violent accident.
Some three hours and fifty m;nutes aft
th
•
er
e accident,
breathalyzer test was taken at Farmington, Dav;s
•
.06 percent blood alcohol by weight result.
to relate this test back

c oun t y,

with a

The State attemptec

to the time of driving, but their

expert witness, Dr. Terry H. Rich, testified that from his exper.
ience different persons could vary in metabolism of alcohol by a'
much as one hundred percent (T. 170) and that an extrapolation ba:
as to any one individual could be purely speculative (T.l7l).
Other than the above described items of evidence there
is no scintilla of evidence that the defendant was driving in ar.
impaired condition arising from the use of alcohol.
POINTS II AND III
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS H AND I AS THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OF WHAT THE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD ALCOH:
BY WEIGHT WAS AT THE TIME HE WAS OPERATING THE AUTOMOBILE.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY REGARDING
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS ARISING FROM BLOOD ALCOHOL BY WEIGHT
LEVELS AT THE TIME OF DRIVING.
Points II and III are so interrelated that they are
discussed together.
The court, over objection of the defendant

(T.l5l~

admitted Exhibit H, the breathalyzer check list, and Exhibit I,

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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the breathalyzer machine result indicator card (T.l?l) and
instructed the jury with regard to presumptions arising from
blood alcohol by weight (see Instruction No. 12), which instruction was duly excepted to by defense counsel (T.284).

The court

further instructed by Instruction 13 (T.258) that the only time the
presumptions in Instruction 12 were applicable was at the time the
defendant was driving or in actual control of the motor vehicle.
The test having been taken between three and one-half
and four hours after the time of driving, there must necessarily
be a relation back to the time of driving by expert testimony.
(41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated)
The Legislature has since this occasion enlarged the
presumption to hold over for one hour after the time of driving.
At the time of the crime herein charged there was no such holdover period.

Furthermore, in the instant case the test was taken

more than three and one-half hours after any driving by the defendant.
The State attempted to make this proof by Dr. Terry H.
Rich, a pathologist, who frankly admitted that under the State's
hypothetical question, any conclusion he could come to as to the
status of the blood alcohol by weight at the time of driving would
be "purely speculative".
The State then tried to qualify Lt. Newell G. Knight,
Utah Highway Patrol, who frankly admitted that he had not tested
blood and further claimed that there was no mechanical basis in the

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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breathalyzer that converted breath alcohol by volume to blood
alcohol by weight, but claimed that the transition
thing that does that is the phenomena of a color
and that's what happens."

d
was rna e by "·

h
c ange, of dens

(T.l41, lines 24-26)

Despite this, the court allowed Lt. Knight to testi'
to the effect that a person who had five beers between 11:30 a.~
and 9:30 p.m. could not have a .06 percent blood alcohol by Weig:
reading at 9:30 p.m.

The question and answer were properly ob

]et.

to ( T • 2 4 4- 5 I .
The only evidence in the record with regard to ~e
presumption is Lt. Knight's assumption, erroneously referred to,
an opinion, that at 9:30 p.m. under the hypothetical

question~

the defendant's blood alcohol could not have been .06 percent.
There is no evidence of what it was at the time of
driving, to wit, 5:45 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Under the circumstances.

giving the presumption instruction to the jury is reversible errc

CONCLUSION
The defendant urges the court to make a thorough revie•
of the record and in view of the entire absence of evidence as tc
the defendant's condition at the time of the accident, and duet:
the lack of adequate testimony or any relation back to the time
of driving on the breath test, further on the basis that the cour
instructed the jury as to presumptions when there was no basis tc
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under Instruction No. 13 for relation back.
Defendant prays the court to reverse the verdict and
judgment as to the charge of driving under the influence of
intoxicants and remand the case back to the lower court under the
misdemeanor charge only.
Respectfully submitted,

DONALD R. WILSON
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Defendant-Appellant were delivered to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney
General of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this 13th day of January, 1978.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

